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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Bracewell & Guiliani, LLP (the “Firm”) appeals the District Court’s order denying 
its motion to stay pending arbitration and granting Mary Jo Sanford a trial to determine 
whether she is bound by the arbitration provision embodied in an agreement with the 
Firm.  Because it is clear from the face of the Complaint that Mary Jo Sanford is required 
to arbitrate her claims, we will reverse.   
I 
 This case arises out of Craig and Mary Jo Sanford’s (the “Sanfords”) efforts to 
                                                   
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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recoup $12.5 million that they entrusted to Jamie Smith.1  When Smith failed to timely 
return the money, Craig Sanford spoke with an attorney at the Firm who “assured the 
Sanfords that [the Firm] would be able to assist them in getting a return of their money.”  
App. 63-64.  “[T]he Sanfords entered into an attorney-client relationship with [the Firm] 
by way of an engagement agreement [the “Engagement Agreement”] between . . . the 
Firm and Mr. Sanford.”  App. 64.  “The Firm agreed to represent the Sanfords in 
obtaining a return of their money,” and “[i]n exchange for this representation, the 
Sanfords paid the firm $50,000.”  Id.  While the Sanfords allege that the Firm represented 
both of them, the Engagement Agreement identifies only Craig Sanford as the client and 
states that the Firm’s “representation does not include employers, partners, spouses, 
siblings, or other family members.”  App. 82.  The Engagement Agreement also contains 
an arbitration provision, which provides that “any controversy, dispute or claim . . . 
arising out of or relating to the . . . engagement of [the Firm], shall be resolved by 
arbitration.”  App. 80.  
 The Sanfords allege that the Firm, “[f]or all intents and purposes,” took “no steps 
to locate or secure [their] money.”  App. 64.  As a result, Craig Sanford spoke with an 
attorney at the Firm and “it was decided that the representation would be terminated.”  Id.   
 The Sanfords thereafter filed a two-count verified Complaint that was 
subsequently removed to federal court, alleging that the Firm engaged in professional 
                                                   
1 As we review this motion under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, these facts are drawn 
from the Complaint. 
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malpractice and breached the Engagement Agreement, which was attached to and 
explicitly referenced therein.  The Firm moved to stay proceedings pending arbitration 
(the “Motion”), arguing that the Sanfords were bound by the terms of the Engagement 
Agreement, including the arbitration provision, because their Complaint alleged that “the 
Sanfords” entered into an attorney-client relationship “by way of” the Engagement 
Agreement.  App. 97 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Firm further argued that 
the Sanfords’ decision to include Mary Jo Sanford as a plaintiff could not defeat their 
obligation to arbitrate the breach of contract claim because Mary Jo Sanford had 
identified the written Engagement Agreement as the contract breached and, since that 
contract contained an arbitration provision, she is “compelled to arbitrate any dispute 
deriving from [it]” under principles of equitable estoppel.  App. 101-102.   
 In response, the Sanfords argued that the arbitration agreement was void as a 
matter of public policy.  They also opposed the Firm’s “suggest[ion] that [Mary Jo 
Sanford] should not be a party to th[e] lawsuit, or [that] naming her as a party [was] an 
attempt to circumvent the arbitration clause,” arguing that Mary Jo Sanford “was clearly 
a third[-]party beneficiary” of the Engagement Agreement.  Opposition to Mot. to Stay 
Arbitration at 14 & n.4, No. 13-cv-1205 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013), ECF No. 7.   
 The District Court conducted hearings on the Motion at which the parties 
presented evidence of, among other things, whether communications prior to execution of 
the Engagement Agreement established an attorney-client relationship between Mary Jo 
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Sanford and the Firm.     
 The District Court granted the Motion with respect to Craig Sanford but denied the 
Motion with respect to Mary Jo Sanford.  It concluded that the arbitration provision did 
not violate public policy, and, relying on the Complaint, determined that Craig Sanford 
was bound to arbitrate.2  With respect to Mary Jo Sanford, the District Court observed 
that she was not a signatory to the Engagement Agreement and that “the Complaint and 
the supporting documents are unclear regarding [Mary Jo] Sanford’s status as a client” 
and “the effect of the arbitration agreement on her.”  App. 29.  For this reason, the 
District Court considered the hearing testimony, applied the summary judgment standard, 
and concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Mary Jo Sanford 
was a client of the Firm and whether, if she was a client, she was bound by the arbitration 
provision.     
 The Firm appeals the District Court’s denial of the Motion with respect to Mary Jo 
                                                   
 2 Mary Jo Sanford has argued in the District Court and at oral argument before this 
Court that mandatory arbitration clauses in agreements between attorneys and their 
clients are unconscionable. Mary Jo Sanford concedes, however, that she has not asked us 
to resolve this issue as part of this appeal. We note, however, that the District Court 
thoroughly addressed this argument, observed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
not provided guidance to attorneys on this issue, and held that Craig Sanford was 
properly informed of the scope and effect of the arbitration agreement contained in the 
Engagement Agreement. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is vested with the power to 
determine whether arbitration clauses between attorneys and clients are permitted under 
Pennsylvania law. Pa. Const. art. V, § 10; see Commonwealth v. Stern, 701 A.2d 568, 
570-71 (Pa. 1997). It has not prohibited such agreements and we see no reason to disturb 





Sanford.       
II3 
 The Firm argues that the District Court should have resolved the Motion based 
upon the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and that, since 
Mary Jo Sanford seeks to recover for breach of a contract that contains an arbitration 
provision, equitable estoppel precludes her from avoiding arbitration.   
 Arbitration is “strictly a matter of contract.”  Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty) 
Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999).  “If a party has not agreed to arbitrate, the courts 
have no authority to mandate that he do so.”  Id.  “[I]n deciding whether a party may be 
compelled to arbitrate under the [Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)], we first consider (1) 
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties and, if so, (2) whether 
the merits-based dispute in question falls within the scope of that valid agreement.”  
Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 To determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between Mary Jo 
Sanford and the Firm, we must initially decide whether the determination is made under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or 56 and thus, what materials we may consider.  Motions to 
compel arbitration are reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6) “[w]here the affirmative defense of 
arbitrability of claims is apparent on the face of a complaint (or . . . documents relied 
                                                   
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B).   
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upon in the complaint).”  Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 
764, 773-74 (3d Cir. 2013) (ellipsis in original and internal quotation marks omitted).  If 
the motion to compel arbitration is not based on a complaint “with the requisite clarity” 
to establish arbitrability or “the opposing party has come forth with reliable evidence that 
is more than a naked assertion . . . that it did not intend to be bound by the arbitration 
agreement, even though on the face of the pleadings it appears that it did,” resort to 
discovery and Rule 56 is proper.  Id. at 774 (ellipsis in original and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 The Complaint reveals that Mary Jo Sanford has sued for breach of the written 
Engagement Agreement, which includes an arbitration clause.  Because “the affirmative 
defense of arbitrability” was therefore apparent from the face of the complaint and the 
documents relied upon therein, Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 773-74 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), the motion should have been reviewed under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the 
factual allegations as true and construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to the 
Sanfords.4  Id. at 772. 
                                                   
4 Moreover, in her opposition to the Motion, Mary Jo Sanford characterized 
herself as a third-party beneficiary of the Engagement Agreement and did not include 
evidence with her opposition showing that she did not intend to be bound by the 
arbitration provision.  For this additional reason, the Motion should have been decided 
under Rule 12(b)(6).   See Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., Ltd., 636 F.2d 
51, 55 (3d Cir. 1980) (judging a motion to compel arbitration under Rule 56 where 
plaintiff presented “[a]n unequivocal denial that the agreement had been made, 
accompanied by supporting affidavits”).  The fact that Mary Jo Sanford later testified that 
she did not agree to arbitrate her claims does not change this conclusion.  This evidence 
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 Applying this standard, we conclude that, although Mary Jo Sanford is not a 
signatory to the Engagement Agreement, she is nevertheless bound by the arbitration 
clause under equitable estoppel principles.  Under the FAA, arbitration provisions may be 
enforced against non-signatories under the doctrine of equitable estoppel if “the relevant 
state contract law recognizes [that principle] as a ground for enforcing contracts against 
third parties.”  Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This Court 
has recognized that “Pennsylvania law allow[s] non-signatories to be bound to [] 
arbitration agreement[s]” and that a non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration clause 
“when the non-signatory knowingly exploits the agreement containing the arbitration 
clause despite having never signed the agreement.”  Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762 
F.3d 264, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone 
Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also 
Dodds v. Pulte Home Corp., 909 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).  Such exploitation 
occurs when a non-signatory embraces a contract by “seeking to enforce terms of that 
contract or asserting claims based on the contract’s other provisions,” Griswold, 762 F.3d 
at 272 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted), and “then turn[s] its 
                                                                                                                                                                    
was not presented as part of her submission in opposition to the Motion.  Rather, the 
testimony was adduced at a hearing.  Under Guidotti, such testimony should not have 
been allowed as the defense of arbitrability was disclosed from the Complaint and its 




back on the portions of the contract, such as an arbitration clause, that it finds 
distasteful,” Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted).    
 Here, Mary Jo Sanford has asserted a breach of contract claim and identified the 
written Engagement Agreement as the contract allegedly breached.  Despite having sued 
to enforce the terms of the Engagement Agreement, she claims that she is not bound by 
the arbitration provision contained therein.  This attempt to “claim the benefit of the 
contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens” is precisely the situation the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel seeks to prevent.  E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 200 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Thus, Mary Jo Sanford, having elected to proceed under a claim for 
breach of the Engagement Agreement, is bound by its terms, including the arbitration 
provision.5  Principles of equitable estoppel therefore mandate arbitration of her claims, 
and the District Court thus erred in denying the Firm’s motion to stay pending arbitration 
of her claims.6 
                                                   
5 At the hearing and in her subsequent briefing, Mary Jo Sanford attempted to 
recast her cause of action from breach of a written contract to breach of an implied 
contract, by introducing evidence of oral exchanges with a member of the Firm that 
occurred before the Engagement Agreement was signed.  Notably, however, she did not 
seek leave to amend her Complaint to proceed under a theory of implied contract.  Thus, 
her Complaint still alleges a claim based on the Engagement Agreement and, as such, she 
is still saddled with its terms. 
6 Mary Jo Sanford is also estopped from avoiding the arbitration clause under 
third-party beneficiary principles.  See Johnson v. Pa. Nat’l Ins. Cos., 594 A.2d 296, 298 
(Pa. 1991); E.I. DuPont, 269 F.3d at 195.  The Sanfords represented to the District Court 
that Mary Jo Sanford “was clearly a third[-]party beneficiary” of the Engagement 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand for proceedings consistent 
with this Opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ECF 7.  Thus, her self-characterization as a third-party beneficiary of the contract binds 
her to its terms.   
